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SHUTTERSTOCK

CONFRONTATION
AFTER OHIO V. CL ARK
BY PROF. ANNE R. TRAUM

The Supreme Court’s decision
in Ohio v. Clark,1 provides
an occasion to take stock
of the Sixth Amendment
Right to Confrontation
since the court’s landmark
2004 decision in Crawford
v. Washington.2 Crawford
strengthened a defendant’s
right to confront his accusers
face-to-face, underscoring
that cross-examination is the
constitutionally preferred
method for testing the reliability
of accusatory statements.
Clark could eliminate that
right in a wide range of cases
where, although the reliability
of a declarant’s out-of-court
statements is critically important,
a defendant has no right to
confrontation.

Confrontation
Requires Crossexamination
Crawford established
that cross-examination is
a touchstone of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation
Clause. Before Crawford, the
court permitted judges to admit
statements without face-to-face
confrontation upon a finding that
the statements bore sufficient
indicia of reliability. Crawford
abandoned that approach and
instead divided accusatory
statements into two camps: those
that are testimonial and those that
are not. Testimonial statements,
the court said, were only
admissible at trial if the declarant
was unavailable and the defendant
had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.3 And though the
court in Crawford did not fully
define testimonial, it stated that
“at a minimum,” the definition
would include “prior testimony
at a preliminary hearing, before
a grand jury, or at a former trial;
and to police interrogations.”4

The statements in Crawford
easily fit this definition. In
Crawford, the defendant, who
was accused of assault, claimed
he acted in self-defense. His wife
made statements during police
interrogation that undermined
his defense, but was unavailable
to testify at trial. Because
her statements to police were
testimonial, admitting them
without an opportunity for
cross-examination violated the
defendant’s right to confrontation.5

Confrontation
Hinges on What’s
“Testimonial”
Since Crawford, the Supreme
Court has honed its definition of
testimonial. A statement qualifies
as testimonial if, in light of all
the circumstances, the primary
purpose of the conversation was to
“creat[e] an out-of-court substitute
for trial testimony.”6 Under this
primary purpose test, statements
to police that prove past events
continued on page 19
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relevant to a criminal
prosecution are
testimonial, such as
a sworn statement to
police following a domestic violence incident, and a certified
drug report from a forensic laboratory.7
Statements to police during an ongoing emergency,
however, are not testimonial if their primary purpose is to
seek or render aid. Such non-testimonial statements include
a victim’s call for help to a 911 emergency operator and
a dying victim’s description of his assailant.8 The court
acknowledged in Michigan v. Bryant that crime victims and
police interrogators may act with mixed motives, prompted
by a blend of safety, accusatory and investigatory concerns.
But the court nonetheless concluded that the primary purpose
of the interrogation in Michigan v. Bryant was “to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”9
Justice Scalia, who authored Crawford and dissented
Michigan v. Bryant, criticized the court for embracing
such a “malleable approach,” which affords judges broad
discretion in deciding what is testimonial and thus when the
Confrontation Clause applies.10

Clark Limits Confrontation
Clark addressed the recurring challenge of confronting
child victims of abuse. Child witnesses have long been
controversial based on concerns about their reliability,
truthfulness, suggestibility and memory.11 Evidentiary laws
aim to shield child victims of abuse from the further trauma
of confronting their abusers in court.12
Clark concerned statements made by a three-year-old
boy to his pre-school teachers, who questioned him about
injuries on his face and arms. The pre-school teachers,
who were required by law to report suspected
child abuse, asked the child, L.P.,
“[W]hat happened?” and “Who did
this?”13 L.P. was “bewildered” and
gave inconsistent answers: he
initially said nothing, then
claimed that he fell, and, finally,
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incriminated the
defendant (Clark).14
Because the child’s
statements were the
only direct evidence against Clark, his counsel would have
been keenly interested in probing those inconsistencies and
testing the child’s credibility.
But L.P. was deemed incompetent to testify at trial due
to his young age, so Clark never got to cross-examine him.15
Instead, the child’s statements were deemed reliable and
admitted through other witnesses. Clark claimed that his
inability to confront the child violated Crawford. Although
the Ohio Supreme Court agreed, the United States Supreme
Court unanimously held that the boy’s statements were not
testimonial, meaning Clark had no right to confront him.
The court’s analysis in Clark turned on three key facts:
the statements were made to a teacher (not law enforcement),
during an “ongoing emergency” and by a three-year-old
child. Statements “made to preschool teachers, not the
police,” the court explained “are much less likely to be
testimonial than statements made to law enforcement
officers.”16 The teachers’ status as mandatory reporters, did
not convert them into law enforcement officers.17 Further,
the boy’s teacher elicited his statement during “an ongoing
emergency,” because the pre-school “needed to know
whether it was safe to release L.P. to his guardian at the
end of the day.”18 So, as in Michigan v. Bryant, learning
the suspect’s identity, though obviously investigatory, was
considered necessary to quell a safety concern.

The Upshot
Clark will constrict defendants’ ability to confront
child accusers. This is because in Clark, the Supreme Court
broadly suggested that “[s]tatements by very young children
will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause,”
because it is “extremely unlikely that a three-year old child in
L.P.’s position would intend his statements to be a substitute
continued on page 20
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for trial testimony.”19
Clark may not
reshape existing cases
in Nevada, but it will
narrow and simplify confrontation analysis. In Nevada, child
statements about abuse are testimonial when made during
interviews with law enforcement or child protective services.20
Nevada cases have treated statements to nurses or doctors as
testimonial,21 but they may not be considered so under Clark,
especially if the victim is very young, or if safety concerns
predominate. Further, Clark may raise questions about
when a child is considered very young, or not old enough to
understand that her statements will be shared with police, or
that the person asking questions is part of law enforcement
or functionally equivalent. Courts will grapple with these
questions. But whereas Crawford was a thumb on the scale
favoring confrontation, Clark appears to be the opposite.
Clark breaks new ground by suggesting several new
default rules, namely that statements to non-police, statements
by young children and statements elicited based on safety
concerns are not testimonial under Crawford. Overall, Clark
limits a defendant’s right to confront his accusers.
Crawford courts have focused, somewhat myopically, on
whether out-of-court statements are testimonial, as the sole

determinant of whether
the defendant has the
right to confrontation.
What has fallen out of
view is the value of cross-examination; whether it would
assist the factfinder in assessing the credibility of a declarant
whose accusations are critical to guilt or whose reliability is
already at issue. Crawford railed against the courts usurping
the factfinder’s role in assessing the reliability of accusatory
statements. Clark shows that the court’s narrow definition
of “testimonial” may lead to even less confrontation, crossexamination and adversarial testing than before Crawford.
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135 S.Ct. 2173 (2015).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 54.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 68-69.
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369 (2011).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822-23 (2006) (domestic
battery affidavit in Hammon v. Indiana was testimonial);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 305, 310-311
(2009) (certified drug report was “functionally identical to live,
in-court testimony”).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006), Michigan v.
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 376-77.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 383 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Clark, 135 S.Ct. at 2182; Myrna S. Raeder,
Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World:
The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation,
82 Ind. L.J. 1009 (2007).
Raeder, 82 Ind. L.J. 1016-17.
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2182.
Id. at 2183.
Id. at 2181.
Id. at 2182.
Flores v. State, 120 P.3d 1170 (Nev. 2005) (statements to law
enforcement and child protective services are testimonial).
State v. Vega, 236 P.3d 632 (Nev. 2010) (statements to nurse
at child advocacy center are testimonial); Medina v. State, 143
P.3d 471 (Nev. 2006) (statements to a sexual assault nurse
examiner are testimonial, even if police are not yet involved).
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